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Abstract—This paper proposes a possible application of quan-
tum key distribution in multi-user network. In modern networks,
variety of multiple access technologies are being used for multi-
user access purposes. In this paper, we focus on a type of widely
used MAC (Media Access Control) protocol—CSMA/CA, and
analyse its use for the quantum key distribution in the network.
This work is based on a successful experiment that implemented
the quantum key distribution over 200 km by using the decoy-
state method. The secret key generation rate as the main indicator
of the performance is given, including the relationship between it
and the number of stations in the network, and the relationship
between the key generation rate and the transmission distance
under the multiple access condition as well.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, random access,
CSMA/CA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of key
distribution that is able to provide the absolute security
in communications, and it has already been developed for
decades of years. Since the first quantum key distribution was
proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (which is known as
BB84 protocol) [1], several different quantum key distribution
protocols had come up in last years. Some of them are based
on the mode of quantum comparing and mearsuring, such as
the well known BB84 protocol, while some are based on the
entanglement of quantum pairs, such as the E91 protocol [2]
and BBM92 protocol [3]. All of these protocols are proved that
the quantum key distribution based on principles of quantum
mechanics is theoretically secure [4], [5]. However, due to
imperfect devices in the QKD’s implementation, there still
can be some kinds of attack in this process. For instance,
photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks, which use the leaked
photon sent by the transmitter to intercept the information [6].
For overcoming this issue, some of modified protocols are
addressed. Here, we focus on an experiment that successfully
implemented the secure quantum key distribution over 200
km by using one of the modified QKD protocol—decoy
state quantum key distribution, and we propose and design
a potential multiple users access network.
Our main contribution in this paper is to design a multi-
user QKD network using CSMA/CA protocol. In addition, we
analyse its performance by utilising Markov chain mathemat-
ical model and the decoy state QKD method. The relationship
between the key generation rate, number of stations and
transmission distance are obtained and demonstrated for the
multiple access condition.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section
II, we review the original BB84 protocol and the decoy
state protocol, which is used in real experiments. In section
III, a communication protocol designed for random access is
reviewed. It is used for the combination of our quantum key
distribution and classical networks. In section IV, we analyse
the suggested QKD network and two relations that related to
the secret key generation rate are given. Finally, the conclusion
is given in section V.
II. DECOY STATE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
The original BB84 protocol is the first quantum key distri-
bution protocol. It was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [1]. The main idea of BB84 protocol can be described
as follows:
1. The transmitter (Alice) generates a quantum bit (qubit)
from 4 types of photon polarisation (vertical, horizontal,
45 degree and -45 degree) randomly and sends it to
the receiver (Bob), then the state of the qubit has been
determined.
2. Bob receives the qubit and measures this qubit that
Alice sent to him by using two types of measur-
ing basis (vertical-horizontal and 45/-45 degree) ran-
domly to decode the qubit. Since Bob’s measur-
ing basis is chosen randomly, there is half chance
to use the wrong basis. It is obvious that there
must be some incorrect measurements. The incor-
rect rate can be calculated as 50%(wrong basis) ∗
50%(correct rate in wrong basis) = 25%.
3. Bob feeds back to Alice what type of measuring basis
he used for each encoded qubit via the public channel
which is the classical channel and can be eavesdropped
by the eavesdropper (Eve). Then, according to this public
information, Alice is able to know which bases are right
and which are wrong from comparing with her own
polarisation of photons she just sent.
4. Finally, Alice tells Bob which results of wrong basis need
to be discarded via the public channel. The remained
results Bob measured are the final sifted results. These
two remained sequences are all the same in both Alice’s
and Bob’s sides, and the same sequence is the generated
secret key.
According to the description above, it is clear that even
though Eve intercepts all the information from the public
channel, she needs to eavesdrop the quantum channel as well
to get the whole information restored. However, if she did
so, the state of the transmitted photon would be destroyed
and this would result in that the error rate increases rapidly
and becomes much higher than the threshold, so that legal
users in the communication are able to perceive its existance.
Thus, benefitting from the no-cloning theorem of quantum
mechanics, the BB84 protocal can build an absolutely secure
communication system theoretically.
In contrast with the principle’s simplicity, the implementa-
tion of QKD in real-life is really difficult. Since the BB84
protocol requires exact single-photon as the quantum source,
it can hardly achieve this requirement due to devices’ imper-
fection. Obviously, single photon cannot be splitted, but if the
light that sent by the quantum source contains more than one
photon, it is quite possible to make PNS attacks. That is, the
eavesdropper can intercept one of photons in the light and
make the rest of photons pass to the receiver. Due to the high
loss of the channel, the eavesdropper may not be found by
pretending that the lost photon is annihilated by the channel.
This description is detailed in [6].
Although there exists a lower bound of the key generation
rate to make sure the QKD’s security in the environment
with small imperfections [7], a modified protocol using decoy
state provides better performance. The decoy state method was
originally addressed in 2003 [6], and more detailed analyses
are in [8]–[10]. The basic idea of the decoy state method is
illustrated as follows. Insert the decoy state pulse into the
signal pulse sequence randomly and send it to the receiver. The
average numbers of the photon in the decoy state pulse and the
signal pulse are different. Thus the counting rates (also called
”yield” in some papers [8]) of single-photon pulses and multi-
photon pulses must be quite different. Because of these two
kinds of pulses are the same except the number of photons, Eve
cannot distinguish the pulse she intercepted if it is the signal
state or the decoy state. After the quantum communication
processing, whether there exists the PNS attack can be detected
by comparing counting rates of these two different pulses.
From the analysis of the decoy state method, the secure key
generation rate is given by [8]:
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where µ represents the average number of photons in a pulse,
q is a factor that represents the protocol’s efficiency, for
example, for BB84 protocol, this factor is 0.5 because of there
is 50% chance that Alice and Bob use different measuring
bases. Qµ is the ratio of the number signal state detections
to the total number of sent signal state pulses, which is also
called the gain of the signal state. In addition, Q1 is the gain
of single-photon pulses, e1 is the error rate associated with
single-photon pulses, Eµ is signal state quantum bit error
(QBER), H2 is the binary Shannon entropy which is given
by H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), and f(Eµ)
is another factor that represents the error correction efficiency
which is usually determined by the specific experiment [8],
[9].
III. RANDOM ACCESS NETWORK
In data communication networks, there is a widely used
method to access the shared channel for multiple users, which
is associated with random access protocols. For instance, in
the 802.11 standard, it adopts a fundamental mechanism called
distributed coordination function (DCF) to access the medium.
This is a random access scheme and based on the carrier
sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
protocol [11]. The CSMA/CA protocol is designed for the
wireless local area network (WLAN), but the basic mechanism
is really able to be used on all types of shared channels. In
this paper, we use this medium access control (MAC) protocol
for reference to analyse the performance of the multi-access
QKD network.
Collisions that come from more than one signals sent by
different stations at the same time cannot be detected on
wireless network. Thus, the CSMA/CA protocol is right for
this kind of networks (collisions cannot be detected). The
completed and detailed information of the CSMA/CA protocol
can be found in 802.11 standards. Here in this paper, we just
focus on the performance analysis.
In data communications, one of the most significant indi-
cators of the performance is the throughput. However, in our
work, only the collision probability is expected. A valuable sat-
uration throughput analysis is given in [11]. In this throughput
analysis, the probability that a station transmits in a randomly
chosen slot time is given as
τ =
2(1− 2p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m) , (2)
where W is the backoff window, m is the maximum backoff
stage which determines the maximum backoff window by
CWmax = 2
mW , and p is the conditional collision probability
which means that this is the probability of a collision seen
by a packet being transmitted on the channel. Actually, the
probability p depends on the probability of remaining station
transmits a packet, which is τ . Because p represents that in
a time slot, when a station is transmitting a packet, at least
one of the n − 1 remaining stations is transmitting as well.
With the assumption that each transmission ”sees” the system
in the same state (Markov chain mathematical model, detailed
in [11]), it gives the p as
p = 1− (1− τ)n−1. (3)
These two unknowns τ and p of independent equations (2)
and (3) can be solved by using numerical techniques.
When the probability τ has been achieved, consider another
probability that there is at least one transmission in the
considered slot time, which is denoted by Ptr. Obviously it is
Ptr = 1− (1− τ)n. (4)
In addition, the probability that a successful transmission given
by the probability that exactly one station transmits on the





Now all the definitions of different cases are obtained: with
the probability 1 − Ptr, the time slot is empty; with the
probability PtrPs, there is a successful transmission; and with
the probability Ptr(1−Ps), the time slot contains a collision.
IV. QKD IN RANDOM ACCESS NETWORK
From 2005, many experiments have successfully performed
the decoy state QKD [12]–[15]. The experiment in [15] is a
typical experiment that implements the QKD over 200 km with
photon polarisation transmitted by optical fiber cable by using
a 3-state decoy state protocol proposed by Wang [16]. All the
specifications in this experiment are treated as assumptions in
our work and the data for simulation is from the result of this
experiment.
As the weak coherent light is used as the quantum source,







Thus, states with average photon number 0, µ and µ′ (represent
the vacuum pulses, signal pulses and decoy pulses separately)
are denoted by ρ0 (which is 0), ρµ and ρ′µ, and corresponding
number of counts are C0, Cµ and C ′µ. With another set of
numbers, N0, Nµ and N ′µ, which are the pulse numbers of
intensity 0, µ and µ′ that Alice sent out, the counting rates of








Another concept or definition distinguished from the count-
ing rate S(S0, Sµ, S′µ) is the counting rates of vacuum pulses,
single-photon pulses and multi-photon pulses from signal
states (decoy) states, which are denoted as s0(s′0), s1(s
′
1)
and sc(s′c). Particularly, the single-photon counting rate is
important for the calculation. The relationship between these
two types of counting rate can be expressed by a set of
equations which is detailed in [15]. Actually, the counting
rate S and s are corresponding to the concept of ”Gain” and
”Yield” in previous paper of the decoy state method theory
[8]–[10].
For simplifying the explanation, here we focus on the
notation of signal states (the decoy states can be easily denoted
by adding the ”prime”). Then the theoretical key generation
rate is given directly here, as
Rµ = qSµ{−H(Eµ) + ∆µ1 [1−H(Eµ1 )]}. (6)
This equation is based on Eq. (1) and proposed by Wang
in his work [9], [16], where q and function H(·) have the
same meanings as Eq. (1), and ∆µ1 is the remaining bits in the
sifted key that defined in [7]. However, Eq. (6) is a theoretical
value of the key generation rate under the condition of that
the QBER has been known. In the real experiment, the value
of the QBER needs to be estimated by using a part of the
whole qubits. Therefore, the final key generation rate should
be updated to
Kµ = Rµ · δe, (7)
TABLE I
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERIMENT.
Parameters Description Values
l Transmission distance. 200
ηDetect Detection efficiency. 0.75
S0 Counting rate from vacuum states. 1.3204× 10−8
C0 Number of counts from vacuum
pulses.
3263
s1 Single photon counting rate from
signal states.
1.2788× 10−6
s′1 Single photon counting rate from
decoy states.
1.3707× 10−6
Cµ Number of counts from µ photons
pulses.
449467
C′µ Number of counts from µ′ photons
pulses.
77157
Lµ Fraction of count bits in signal
states.
0.1
L′µ Fraction of count bits in decoy
states.
0.1
Sµ Counting rate from signal states. 9.0941× 10−7
S′µ Counting rate from decoy states. 3.1223× 10−7
µ Average photon number of signal
states.
0.6
µ′ Average photon number of decoy
states.
0.2




µ′ QBER upper bound of decoy
states.
0.6
Eµ Tested (observed) QBER of signal
states.
0.0196
E′µ Tested (observed) QBER of decoy
states.
0.0404
where δe represents the length of the bits that is used for





where Lµ is the fraction of the count bits in signal states used
for QBER tests, which is provided by the experiment; Cµ and
Sµ are the number of counts which comes from the intensity
µ and the counting rate of pulses of intensity µ. According to
the previous talk in this paper, δe includes all the neccessary
information for the calculation with the data of the experiment.
The useful data for the calculation from the experiment [15]
is listed in the table.
Suppose that this peer-to-peer QKD will be used in a
channel shared network to satisfy multiple users’ access re-
quirements, see Fig. 1. In this network, we are trying to analyse
the performance of QKD used by multiple users. Assume
that there are finite number of terminals in the network and
connected each other by an ideal channel, so it is reasonable
to assume there exists a constant and independent collision
probability of a packet transmitted by each stations. Thus
from our previous talk, it can be achieved that the secret key
Fig. 1. Topology of all optical fiber connected QKD network. The line is the
logical classical channel, and the dash line is the logical quantum channel.
Usually, the channel will be multi-used since the quantum source is also the
weak coherent light.
generation rate per user should be expressed as
KCSMA = KQKD ∗ P, (9)
where KQKD is the key generation rate of two-terminals
QKD, P is the probability of a successful transmission.
Combine the QKD protocol that experiment used with the
CSMA protocol, the secret key generation can be expressed
as
KCSMA = KµPtrPs, (10)
and the numerical result is shown as Fig. 2.
Follow this result, we will discuss the relationship between
the key generation rate and the communication distance under
the multi-access condition. Even though some parameters are
not given in the experiment [15], the analysis is still able to be
done according to the principle of the decoy method. Refer to















= s0 + 1− e−ηµ (11)
and
Eµ = E0s0 + edetector(1− e−ηµ), (12)
where n is the photon numbers included in pulses, Sn is
the counting rate of n-photon pulses, sn is the counting rate
of n-photon pulses from signal states, η is the transmission
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. The average key generation rate (bits/s/user) with different numbers
of stations.
efficiency that depends on the transmittance and the detection
efficiency ηDetect, and edetector is the probability that a photon
is detected by the imperfect detector. The parameters η and
edetector can be calculated by solving Eq. (11) and (12).
The parameter η affects most observed data in an ex-
periment, such as the counting rate S and the QBER E.
Meanwhile, η is affected by the loss coefficient α, which
represents the light pulse attenuation with the increment of
the distance. The relation between them can be expressed as
η = 10−
αl
10 · ηDetect, (13)
where l is the transmission distance in km and α is the loss
coefficient in dB/km.
Fig. 3. Relationship between the transmission distance and the key generation
rate. This is a calculated theoretical result based on the experiment [15]
partly, since some estimated values instead of parameters not given in that
experiment.
After calculating these parameters not given directly, the
QBER Eµ can be re-estimated by using Eq. (14), which
is independent with Eq. (12), and Eq. (15), which is an







= s0 + η. (15)
For simplifying the analysis, Eq. (11)-(15) simply connects
the transmission distance and the counting rate and the QBER.
Thus, by using Eq. (6), (7), (8) and (10), the relationship
between the transmission distance and the key generation rate
will be found. The numerical result is shown in Fig. 3.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the theory of random access network and the suc-
cessful experiment of the decoy state quantum key distribution,
a possible scheme of QKD random access network is proposed
and the main performance of QKD—key generation rate is
analysed in this paper. Because of the difference between
tha classical data packets and quantum source pulses, all
the methods rely on the physical implementation cannot be
simply used in quantum communications except the methods
of logical analysis. In this paper, because of the method of
the accessing refers to the classical communications, which
is CSMA protocol, the quantum secret key generation rate
is related to the pulse transmitting, so that it is affected by
the probability of successful transmissions in the channel. The
relationship between the quantum secret key generation rate
and the number of stations on a shared channel random access
network is studied. Since most work on QKD tries to enhance
the distance of quantum communications, the relationship be-
tween the transmission distance and the secret key generation
rate under the multi-access condition is considered as well.
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